Globalization - Society - Economics

Perceived of as an unequalled economic and business opportunity for some and as an unmitigated threat to economic welfare and business survival by others, globalization is, irrespective of any and all opinions, a reality. Its diverse effects, beneficial to some countries and harmful to others, is subtlety hinted at in the definition forwarded by Smith and Baylis (2001). As they write, globalisation may be defined as "process of increasing interconnectedness between societies such that events in one part of the world more or less have effects on people and societies far away" (Smith and Baylis, 2001, p. 7). Globalisation functions to remove the economic barriers between nations, constrains the capacity of states to exercise protectionism and induces increased interconnectivity between the many economies in the global system, culminating in the transformation of these multiple economies and their associate markets into a single economy and market. While there are undoubted b enefits to that, not least of which is the accompanying expansion of each companys/economys market for goods and services, the associate market and economic threats are almost too numerous to mention. As Juhasz (2002) asserts, globalisation is not simply a global economic order which has allowed for global integration but it is the imposition of the neo-liberal economic ideology upon the world and, as such, constitutes a declaration of the rise of the American politico-economic empire. While hardly going so far as to argue globalisation to be American imperialism, the fact is that it has allowed for the unsurpassed political and economic domination of the United States, on the one hand, and the domination of the Northern political economies over the Southern ones on the other. Within the context, of the stated, regionalisation emerges as a viable politico-economic survival tactic; a strategy by which states and economies can meet and withstand the threat to sovereignty and e conomic survival posed by both the collective North and by the United States.While neo-liberal economist and the proponents of globalisation argue it as the optimal strategy for development and the elimination of poverty, this claim is hardly borne out by post-globalisation economic figures. Consequent to the implementation of the neo-liberal economic agenda upon the global economy, implying the removal of barriers to trade and most forms of protectionism, 90% of the global GDP was owned and controlled by just under 20% of the Norths citizens, while 20% of the Souths citizens controlled and owned under 1% of the global GDP (Why the World, 2005). In addition to that, and as Longsworth (1999) reports, the combined wealth of Microsofts three top executives exceeds the combined wealth of fifty LDCs. Indeed, globalisation has substantially and dangerously expanded the gap between the haves and the have-nots, as evidenced through the fact that the income gap between the fifth of t he worlds people living in the richest countries and the fifth in the poorest was 30:1 in 1960, 60:1 in 1990,and jumped to 74:1 in 1997 (`Indonesias despair,2000). Economic statistics establish globalisation as an instrument for the transference of wealth and resources from the South to the north, from the poor to the rich and not, as its proponents have claimed a strategy for the elimination of poverty and underdevelopment. The means by which globalisation transfers wealth and resources from the have-nots to the haves are, within the context of any discussion on regionalization versus globalisation, extremely informative. Globalisation, as earlier stated, has imposed neo-liberal economic agendas upon national economies, dictating the virtual withdrawal of states from their domestic economies and constraining their powers to exercise protectionism, if only to allow their infant industries the space and time to grow and stabilize. As Schwam-Baird (2003) writes, insofar as bot h developing and single national economies are concerned, the consequences are potentially harmful. Domestic markets are being flooded with imported goods with the consequence being that domestic producers are gradually loosing their market share and are being pushed out of their own markets. Virtually strong-armed in agreeing to WTO rules and into consenting to the implementation of IMF reforms or else be isolated from the global economy, LDCs have found themselves in a situation wherein they must reduce barriers to trade, restrict government involvement in the economic sphere, reduce the size and scope of government activity, and allow the market to work its magic (Schwam-Baird, 2003, p.317). Finding themselves in a situation of unfair trade relations and unequal competition, LDCs are not only unable to compete but are gradually loosing control over their own economies and, in the process, are becoming both economically and politically marginalized (Schwam-Baird, 2003).Not only are LDCs being overwhelmed and threatened by globalisation but, so are individual/single national economies. Sangmoon (2002) contends that globalisation is little other than American politico-economic imperialism and, quite simply, boils down to an agenda for the facilitation of the rise of the American Empire. While that view is, without doubt, somewhat exaggerated and blatantly biased, it is founded upon an incontrovertible truth. That truth is that the greater majority, standing at over 85% of the worlds multinational corporations are American; that truth is that the greater percentages of both global trade and international foreign investment are spearheaded by the United States and American corporate entities (Sangmoon, 2002). The United States is the worlds largest economy, most influential political and economic actor and most powerful military and globalisation is its agenda for the penetration into domestic economies, and the exertion of politico-economic cont rol over the states in question. Indeed, within the context of the stated, single European nations, as the case with practically any of the developed/industrialized countries, let alone the Southern ones, cannot compete. Indeed, some European political economic scholars have even voiced concern over the capacity and ability of single European states to survive the post-globalisation politico-economic challenge posed by the United States (Nash, 2003). It is, thus, that regionalization emerges, first and foremost, as a counter-force to globalisation; as a strategy for surviving the challenges posed by globalisation and the American politico-economic empire.The definitions which political economic theorists have forwarded for regionalization firmly establish it as a counter-force to globalisation. Cammet (1999, n.p) defines regionalization as defensive integration, a state imposed upon blocs of countries, upon regions by their determination to resist globalisation/American impe rialism. Similarly, Hay and Marsh (2000) present regionalization as a by-product of globalisation; as an expressed counter-offensive to the forces of U.S.-led globalisation, and a determined effort to mitigate the adverse effects of globalisation on both domestic economies and national sovereignty. Regionalisation, from within the parameters of the definitions offered, is intrinsically linked to globalisation, insofar as it arose because of it, in spite of it and for the explicit purpose of resisting it.Proceeding from the definitions presented, it would seem that regionalization is a self-negating phenomenon. As may be inferred from Petras and Voltmeyers (2001) argument, regionalization is the unification of nations located within a single region for the explicit purpose of defending themselves from globalisation, from the American Empire. Accordingly, its raison deter is the resistance of globalisation, the American Empire. Should it, however, succeed and should globalisat ion retreat, the very reason upon which regionalization is founded, will cease to exist (Petras and Voltmeyer, 2001). It is, thus, that Petras and Voltmeyer (2001) argue that regionalization is not simply a counter-force to globalisation whose sole aim is the defeat of the neo-liberal politico-economic global agenda but, just as globalisation, is an empire-building process.Even while accepting that regionalization, especially in light of the emergence of a group of European nations (northern states and advanced economies) as the only successful deep politico-economic regional integration experiment to date, is an empire-building phenomenon that does not mean that it is not a counterforce to globalisation. As did Petras and Voltmeyer (2001), Mittleman (2000) argues that globalisation, as a politically correct synonym for American imperialism, functions as a very threat to the capacity of nations to survival on both the economic and political levels. The United States, both fu elled and fortified by its multinationals has emerged, not only as the worlds only superpower, but as an unequalled and unmatched force. More importantly, it is a force which is determined to overwhelm and consume other nations. Single economies, irrespective of their individual strength, cannot resist this power/force alone but can as a collectivity. Indeed, they can should they respond through the formation of their own `empire, a union of nations which, besides being capable of surviving globalisation, possibly thriving under it, can emerge as a counterforce to the American empire (Mittleman, 2000). Consequently, from this interpretive perspective, not only is regionalization a strategy for survival under, and resistance of, globalisation but it is, potentially, a project for the resistance of the American Empire through the recreation of the bipolar world order.In the final analysis, regionalization is, quite incontrovertibly, a counterforce to globalisation, with it bei ng quite valid to argue that, as a phenomenon, it rose in direct response to globalisation. This should hardly be surprising considering the fact that globalisation functions as a very real threat, not only to the economic survival, political independence and national sovereignty of the nations of the South but, to the countries of the North. Regionalisation, as such, emerges as a strategy for the pooling of national resources and unifying for the maximisation of strength and, hence, capacity to resist and survive. 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